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CHANCES AS PROTECTED INTERESTS: RECOVERY 
FOR THE LOSS OF A CHANCE AND 
INCREASED RISK 
Two closely related tort concepts, loss of chance and increased risk, 
have gained increasing, but not general, acceptance by courts. The loss of 
a chance of avoiding injury or disease and the increased risk of injury or 
disease are measureable injuries caused by negligent conduct. Loss of 
chance cases typically arise in the context of medical malpractice,· in-
creased risk cases often arise when a plaintiff has been negligently exposed 
to an element which makes him susceptible to a particular disease. This 
comment examines the treatment that courts have given loss of chance and 
increased risk cases. The author concludes that courts should recognize 
chances as protected interests and permit recovery for loss of chance and 
increased risk. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The tort concept of "loss of chance" is unsettled, misunderstood and 
misconceptualized. 1 A loss of chance exists where the defendant's con-
duct has caused the plaintiff to lose a chance of avoiding some physical 
injury or disease. 2 Many American courts have traditionally recognized 
only manifested physical injuries, and not chances, as compensable inter-
ests.3 Consequently, courts have failed to conceptualize the relationship 
between causation and damage when the damage is the loss of a chance. 
This confusion has resulted in judicial distortion of the traditional stan-
dard for proving proximate cause in loss of chance cases.4 In many 
cases, unjust summary dispositions result even though a plaintiff has in-
curred statistically measureable damages due to the negligent conduct of 
the defendant. 5 
Some courts, however, do recognize a cause of action for the loss of 
a chance.6 These courts recognize that the loss of a chance of avoiding 
some physical injury or disease is an injury which is separate and distinct 
from the manifested injury or disease. Recovery is permitted for the re-
duction in chance of avoiding the physical injury or disease which was 
caused by the defendant's negligence.7 A typical loss of chance scenario 
1. See generally King, Causation. Valuation. and Chance in Personal Injury Torts In-
volving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). 
2. See Comment, Proving Causation in "Loss of a Chance" Cases: A Proportional Ap-
proach, 34 CATH. V.L. REV. 747, 749 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Proving 
Causation). 
3. See Comment, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recover for the Loss of a Chance 
of Survival, 12 PEPPER DINE L. REV. 973, 978 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, The 
Right to Recover]; see also infra notes 35-63 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 28-30, 46-63 and accompanying text. These results most often occur 
where, prior to the defendant's negligent act, the plaintiff had a less-than-even 
chance of avoiding injury or harm. See generally King, supra note 1. 
6. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. 
7. See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. 
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arises when a doctor negligently misdiagnoses or fails to diagnose a dis-
ease. For example, assume that at the time of a negligent misdiagnosis a 
cancer patient had a forty percent chance of survival. 8 Because of the 
negligent misdiagnosis, the patient receives no medical treatment. Upon 
a subsequent diagnosis of cancer, the patient's chance of survival has 
been reduced to twenty percent because of the delay in treatment. There-
after the patient, unresponsive to the delayed treatment, dies. The widow 
of the patient brings a negligence action against the doctor.9 A court 
permitting recovery for the loss of a chance will award damages for the 
loss of a twenty percent chance of survival. 
This comment begins by tracing the development of chance recovery 
in contract law. It then analyzes the improper treatment accorded loss of 
chance by courts that use the chance in their determination of proximate 
cause, and how this treatment has distorted the traditional standard for 
proving proximate cause. Next, the comment discusses decisions which 
recognized chances as protected interests and permitted recovery for loss 
of chance. Also, it discusses a related area of tort, increased risk of in-
jury or disease. Next, computational models for valuing damages in loss 
of chance and increased risk cases are discussed. This comment recom-
mends how the Maryland courts should approach both loss of chance 
and increased risk cases. Finally, this comment concludes by asserting 
that courts should acknowledge that chances are protected interests and 
should refrain from distorting the proximate cause standard. 
II. CHANCE RECOVERY AND THE DISTORTION OF THE 
STANDARD FOR PROVING PROXIMATE CAUSE 
A. Derivation of Chance Recovery from Contract Law 
Recovery for loss of chance in tort has its roots in contract law. \0 
The theory for recovery was established under English common law, 
where courts permitted recovery by plaintiffs who lost a less-than-even 
8. "Cancer statistics are based on various 'survival rates,' which represent the length of 
time victims have survived after a given date, whether it be the date of diagnosis or 
of the beginning of treatment." Comment, Proving Causation, supra note 2, at 749 
n.24 (citing American Joint Committee on Cancer, MANUAL FOR STAGING OF 
CANCER, at II (2d ed. 1983)). 
9. In order to prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must establish: (I) that the 
defendant had a duty, or obligation, recognized by law to protect the plaintiff from 
some risk; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) there existed a close causal 
connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) the plaintiff suf-
fered actual loss or damages. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, 
§ 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). The third and fourth elements have been the object 
of distress and confusion among courts in loss of chance cases. For the purposes of 
this comment it will be assumed that the first and second elements may be or have 
been established by the plaintiff. 
10. See Cooper, Assessing Possibilities in Damages Awards - The Loss of a Chance or the 
Chance of a Loss, 37 SASK. L. REV. 193, 197-209 (1975); King, supra note I, at 
1378-79. 
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chance of obtaining a favorable contractual result, such as profits. I I 
Damages were awarded on a "pro-rata" basis, whereby the plaintiff re-
ceived an award reflecting the percentage probability that the defendant 
had diminished the likelihood of achieving the favorable outcome. 12 
American courts, at first hesitant to recognize chances as protected inter-
ests,13 followed English cases and permitted pro-rata recovery in contract 
disputes. 14 Recognition of chances as protected interests in tort, how-
ever, has not gained general acceptance. IS 
B. Recovery for the Loss of a Chance in Tort: The Distortion of the 
Standard for Proving Proximate Cause 
Many American courts have failed to recognize the injury sought to 
be redressed in loss of chance cases in which the plaintiff had a less-than-
even chance of avoiding injury or disease. 16 Some courts, failing to rec-
ognize that the loss of a chance should be a compensable interest, have 
applied the loss to their determination of the proximate cause of the man-
11. Id.; see also Schaefer, Uncertainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 719, 754-59 (1978). 
In Chaplin v. Hicks, 2 K.B. 786 (C.A. 1911), the plaintiff was one of fifty semi-
finalists in a beauty contest. Id. at 787. Twelve out of the fifty were to be awarded 
acting contracts. /d. at 786. The defendant failed to notify the plaintiff of her selec-
tion as a semi-finalist, causing her to miss the final evaluation round. Id. at 788. 
The plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract. Id. The jury determined that 
the value of the lost chance was £100. Id. The lower court's judgment was affirmed 
by the Court of Appeal, which recognized that the plaintiff was not suing for the 
value of the acting contract, but the value of a chance to win the contract. Id. pas-
sim. The court held that such a chance is a compensable interest. Id. at 793. Fur-
ther, the court noted that difficulty in assessing or computing damages should not 
bar recovery. Id. at 791; see also Davies v. Taylor, 3 All E.R. 836 (H.L. 1972). 
12. Cooper, supra note 10, at 197-209; Note, Damages Contingent Upon Chance, 18 
RUTGERS L. REV. 875, 885-92 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Damages Contingent). 
13. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124 U.S. 444 (1888) (no damages for lost 
chance of future profits when plaintiff could not prove to a certainty he would have 
made such profits); Collatz v. Fox Wis. Amusement Corp., 239 Wis. 156,300 N.W. 
162 (1941) (no damages for plaintiff who was wrongly eliminated from contest when 
he could not prove he would have won the contest). See generally Cooper, supra 
note 10, at 209-15; Note, Damages Contingent, supra note 12, at 885-92. 
Early commentators asserted that the loss of a chance should be compensable. 
See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES, § 31, at 117-23 (1935); Malone, Ruminations on 
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 80 (1956); Schaefer, supra note II, at 762; Note 
and Comment, The Rule of Certainty and the Value of a Chance, 10 MICH. L. REV. 
392 (1911). 
14. See, e.g., Mange v. Unicorn Press, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (recovery 
for lost chance to win a contest); Wachtel v. National Alfalfa Journal Co., 190 Iowa 
1293, 176 N.W. 801 (1920) (contestant in a magazine contest recovered damages for 
lost chance to win the contest when the contest was discontinued in her "district"); 
Hall v. Nassau Consumers' Ice Co., 260 N.Y. 417, 183 N.E. 903 (1933) (recovery 
for the lost chance of a $5,000 bond payment); Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. v. Bell, 
197 S.W. 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (recovery of damages for lost chance of winning 
prize money caused by delay of shipper in transporting hogs to a stock show). 
15. See infra notes 35-63 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 35-63 and accompanying text. 
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ifested physical injury or disease. 17 This treatment has led to the distor-
tion of the standard for proving proximate cause18 and the inappropriate 
compensation of plaintiffs. 19 
1. The Preponderance Standard 
The concept of proximate cause20 limits the liability of any defend-
ant whose conduct, while a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, was so 
remotely related to the injury that the law prescribes that he cannot be 
held accountable for the injury.21 Proximate cause requires there to be 
some reasonable connection between the act of the defendant and the 
injury suffered by the plaintiffP Generally, a tort plaintiff must establish 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 23 
17. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. The manifested physical injury or 
disease results when the plaintiff's chance of avoiding injury or disease is reduced to 
zero. For example, the manifested injury in the scenario in the Introduction is 
death. Similarly, where a plaintiff suffers an increased risk of cancer, the manifest-
ing disease is cancer. The increased risk of cancer is the compensable injury pres-
ently suffered by the plaintiff. See also infra text and accompanying notes 90-111. 
18. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. 
20. According to Dean Prosser, proximate literally means near or immediate, however, 
he .asserts that those definitions are confusing because they emphasize physical or 
mechanical closeness. For this reason, Prosser advocates that legal or responsible 
cause would be more accurate terminology. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 
9, § 42, at 273. . 
21. Id. § 41, at 264. Such limitations are necessary, for in a philosophical sense, a harm 
could be traced back eternally to its source. Similarly, the consequences of any act 
may set forces in motion with far-reaching results. Id. See generally Malone, supra 
note 13. 
22. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 41, at 264; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430-431 (1965). The Restatement provides that the follow-
ing constitute legal cause: (1) conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about 
the harm and (2) those circumstances when "there is no rule of law relieving the 
actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in 
the harm." Id. § 431. Moreover, the determination of proximate cause is subject to 
basic considerations of fairness and social policy. See, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 
Md. 160, 171,359 A.2d 548,555 (1976) (landlord has a duty to keep common areas 
of apartment building safe); Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16, 264 A.2d 851, 
855 (1970) (builder of wall not liable where wall collapsed, killing a child, four and 
one-half years after the wall was erected). 
23. Robin Express Transfer, Inc. v. Canton R.R. Co., 26 Md. App. 321, 334-35, 338 
A.2d 335, 343 (1975); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 9, § 41, at 
269 (plaintiff must establish that it is more likely than not that the defendant caused 
his injury). The preponderance standard is one of three standards of proof used by 
courts. The substantial possibility standard permits recovery "for a loss even when 
there was proof of only a substantial possibility that the [injury] would have been 
avoided but for the tortious conduct." King, supra note 1, at 1368. 
A third standard for proving causation, the actual certainty standard, is the 
least prevalent standard for proving causation, because "the very idea of certainty of 
unknown and future events is implausible." Id. at 1367; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B comment b (1965) (causation is incapable ofmathemat-
ical proof; one cannot say with absolute certainty what would have happened had 
the defendant not acted otherwise). 
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To meet the preponderance standard in a jurisdiction which does 
not recognize chances as protected interests, a plaintiff must establish 
that there existed a better-than-even chance of avoiding physical injury 
or disease.24 A plaintiff meeting this standard will be compensated, not 
for the lost chance, but only for the particular physical injury suffered. 25 
Frequently, this standard for recovery causes overcompensation of plain-
tiffs.26 For example, the plaintiff in a survivorship action in which the 
decedent had a fifty-one percent chance of survival will receive one hun-
dred percent of the value of the survivorship claim if he proves the de-
fendant's negligence. Thus, if the plaintiff proves causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence, but not to a certainty, he will receive 
complete satisfaction for the resulting injury. Recovery will not be dis-
counted by the probability that the death may have occurred notwith-
standing the defendant's conduct.27 
Summary judgment for the defendant results, however, where the 
plaintiff had a less-than-even chance of avoiding injury or disease. 28 
Under such circumstances the plaintiff will receive no compensation 
from the defendant.29 Thus, for example, a plaintiff whose decedent had 
a forty-nine percent or less chance of survival prior to defendant's negli-
gent act will not recover any damages in a survivorship action. 30 
The preceding are illustrative of the unjust results stemming from 
the refusal of many courts to recognize chances as protected interests and 
the application of the "all-or-nothing" rule when assessing damages in 
loss of chance cases.3 ! Because medicine is not an exact science, many 
loss of chance cases become a "battle of the experts" in which the liti-
24. Otherwise, it is not "more likely than not" that the defendant caused the plaintiff's 
injury. See King, supra note I, at 1365-70. 
25. See id. at 1365. 
26.Id. 
27. Id.; see also Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 632-34, 664 P.2d 
474,486-87 (1983) (en bane) (Pearson, J., concurring) (advocating the adoption of 
pro-rata recovery in tort). 
28. Under the preponderance standard, a plaintiff with a less-than-even chance of avoid-
ing harm will not be able to establish a prima facie argument that the defendant was 
the cause of his injury. Comment, Proving Causation, supra note 2, at 752. 
29. See King, supra note I, at 1365; Comment, Proving Causation, supra note 2, at 752. 
30. It is likely that, notwithstanding instructions to apply the all-or-nothing principle, 
juries award damages for the loss of a chance. Orloff & Stedinger, A Framework for 
Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 
1173-74 (1983); Comment, Proving Causation, supra note 2, at 782-83 n.273. 
31. The "all-or-nothing" rule requires that a plaintiff be awarded one hundred percent 
of damages attributable to a manifested injury if he meets the preponderance stan-
dard for proximate cause. A plaintiff not meeting this standard receives no damages 
award. See generally Cooper, supra note 10, at 209-15; Note, Damages Contingent, 
supra note 12, at 885-92. It has been suggested that the reason for the "all-or-
nothing" rule is that American judges lack confidence in the jury's exercise of dis-
cretion. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 26, at 101. Modem juries, however, 
have proven capable of assessing damages according to proportion of fault. See, 
e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (market share liability). 
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gants attempt to establish that the chance did or did not exceed fifty 
percent. 32 Professor King asserts that the application of the "all-or-noth-
ing" rule in loss of chance cases is arbitrary and that it "subverts the 
deterrence objectives of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of 
conduct that causes statistically demonstrable 10sses."33 He notes that 
some courts, anxious to mitigate the harshness of the approach, have 
distorted the traditional preponderance standard for proving causation.34 
2. Relaxed Standard for Proving Proximate Cause 
Under a relaxed standard, a plaintiff with a less-than-even chance of 
avoiding harm can prove proximate cause by showing that the defend-
ant's conduct substantially reduced the plaintiff's chance. 35 A case often 
cited as the leading authority of the relaxed standard for proving proxi-
mate cause is Hicks v. United States. 36 In Hicks, the plaintiff's decedent 
died from an obstruction of the small intestine. 37 The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant negligently misdiagnosed the decedent's condition.38 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court's dismissal of the case and held that the plaintiff may prove 
proximate cause where the defendant has substantially destroyed a 
chance of survival. 39 The court stated: 
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively 
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the 
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the 
chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If 
there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defend-
ant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it possible to 
demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have hap-
pened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to 
come to pass. The law does not in the existing circumstances 
32. Because determining percentage probabilities in medicine is difficult, defendants 
often benefit from the uncertainty their conduct may have created. King, supra note 
1, at 1378; cf McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72, 75 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that 
the best medical treatment cannot guarantee success and medicine is not an exact 
science); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1970) (same); Hicks v. United 
States, 368 F.2d 626,632 (4th Cir. 1966) (defendant should not benefit from uncer-
tainty created by his conduct); Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 
Ariz. 597, 607, 688 P.2d 605, 615 (1984) (en banc) ("for every expert witness who 
evaluates the lost chance at 49% there is another who estimates it at closer to 
51%"). 
33. King, supra note 1, at 1377; see a/so infra notes 85-86, 99 and accompanying text. 
34. Id.; see infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. 
35. Consistent with the "all-or-nothing" principle, a plaintiff meeting this relaxed stan-
dard for proving causation will receive full compensation for his injuries. See supra 
notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
36. 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966) (applying Virginia law). In Hicks, the plaintiff brought 
suit against a Navy doctor under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 628. 
37. Id. at 629. 
38.Id. 
39. Id. at 632. 
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require the plaintiff to show to a certainty that the patient 
would have lived had she been hospitalized and operated on 
promptly.40 
145 
The above passage, however, is dicta; the uncontradicted expert testi-
mony at trial established that with proper medical attention, the dece-
dent would have had a better-than-even chance of surviva1.41 
Some courts, concluding that Hicks relaxed the standard for proving 
proximate cause in loss of chance cases, have adopted a relaxed standard 
for proving causation in medical malpractice cases.42 Section 323 of the 
40. Id. (emphasis in original). The court analogized to maritime cases which, in devel-
oping the "rescue doctrine," relaxed the standard for proving causation. Under the 
rescue doctrine, the captain of a ship has a duty to make a reasonable attempt to 
rescue an overboard seaman. "[C]ausation is proved if the master's omission [in not 
conducting a search] destroys the reasonable possibility of rescue." Id. at 633 (em-
phasis in original) (quoting Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 
(4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963»; see also Abbott v. United States 
Lines, 512 F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1975) (ship must conduct a search if a reasonable 
possibility of rescuing an overboard seaman exists); Kirincich v. Standard Dredging 
Co., 112 F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1940) (contributory negligence is no defense to the 
duty of rescue). 
Some pre-Hicks negligence cases allowed a relaxed standard for proving causa-
tion. See, e.g., Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 
47 (2d Cir. 1925) (chance that a guard rope may have prevented a seaman from 
being swept overboard); Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 
Cal. App. 591,291 P. 848 (1930) Gury question as to whether absence of lifeguard 
from swimming pool was cause of drowning notwithstanding the fact that decedent 
may have drowned anyway); Harvey v. Silber, 300 Mich. 510, 2 N.W.2d 483 (1942) 
(defendant liable where his misdiagnosis of a bullet wound destroyed the patient's 
chance of survival); Burt v. Nichols, 264 Mo. 1, 173 S.W. 681 (1915) (landlord held 
liable for missing fire escape, even though decedent may have perished if there was a 
fire escape); Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952) 
(patient may have survived had he received prompt medical attention and not been 
confined for eighteen hours to a jail cell). 
41. Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632; see also King, supra note 1, at 1368 n.53. Thus, Hicks did 
not change the standard for proving causation. See Clark v. United States, 402 F.2d 
950, 953 nA (4th Cir. 1968) ("Certainly Hicks laid down no new rule of law with 
respect to either negligence or proximate cause ... "); Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 
536, 552-53, 525 A.2d 643, 651 (1987) (same). 
42. See, e.g., Daniels v. Hadley Memorial Hosp., 566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (recov-
ery permitted when negligence destroys a substantial chance of survival); Ascher v. 
Gutierrez, 533 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (evidence sufficient that jury could have 
concluded that but for abandonment by anesthesiologist, plaintiff would not have 
suffered brain damage); Jeanes v. Milner, 428 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying 
Arkansas law) (recovery permitted where doctor's misdiagnosis of a lympho-
sarcoma in the decedent's throat decreased his chance of survival from 35% to 
24%); Brown v. United States, 419 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1969) (applying Missouri law) 
(causation proven where plaintiff loses a substantial possibility of survival); Morten-
sen v. Memorial Hosp., 105 A.D.2d 151,483 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1984) (dismissing plain-
tiff's complaint, but recognizing with approval Hicks substantial possibility test); 
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974) (per 
curiam), a./f'd mem., 37 N.Y. 719,337 N.E.2d 128,374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975) (recov-
ery permitted where evidence showed decedent would have had a 20% to 40% 
chance of survival if the necessary medication had been received); Brown v. Kou-
lizakis, 229 Va. 524, 331 S.E.2d 440 (1985) (recovery permitted if negligence de-
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Restatement (Second) of Torts43 which provides for recovery where the 
defendant's negligence increases the plaintiff's risk to physical harm, has 
also been relied upon by courts as justification for relaxing the standard 
for proving causation in loss of chance cases.44 Courts utilizing section 
323 permit recovery if the plaintiff has introduced evidence establishing 
that the defendant's conduct substantially increased the risk of harm to 
the plaintiff.45 
Other jurisdictions, however, steadfastly adhere to the traditional 
preponderance standard.46 A prominent case illustrating this position is 
prives patient of a substantial possibility of survival). See generally Bradt & 
Guthmann, Recovery for the Value of a Chance in Medical Malpractice Cases: 
Bringing Minnesota's Standard of Causation Up to Date, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 459 (1986); Giancola, Proximate Cause in a Medical Malpractice Action: Kal-
len berg v. Beth Israel Hospital Revisited, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 324 (1987); Wright, 
Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1737 (1985); Annotation, Medical Mal-
practice: "Loss of Chance" Causality, 54 A.L.R.4th 10 (1987). 
A Hicks standard has also been applied in negligence cases not involving medi-
cal malpractice. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975) (plaintiff 
need not establish to a certainty that decedent, killed in an auto accident, would 
have been saved had head restraint not been defective), vacated and remanded, 537 
F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 
1986) (en banc) Gury could find that landlord's inaction was a substantial cause of 
child being struck by a bicyclist because speed bumps were not installed on apart-
ment complex's road). 
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) provides: 
Id. 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services 
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the 
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm resUlting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of 
such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance 
upon the undertaking. 
44. See, e.g., Foskey v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 1047 (D.R.1. 1979) (applying Penn-
sylvania law); Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 688 
P.2d 605 (1984) (en banc); Sharp v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 710 P.2d 1153 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 
155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426 (1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss 
Memorial Hosp., 143 Ill. App. 3d 479, 493 N.E.2d 6, cert. denied, 112 Ill. 2d 579 
(1986); Aasheim V. Humberger, 695 P.2d 825 (Mont. 1985); Evers V. Dollinger, 95 
N.J. 399,471 A.2d 405 (1984); Jones V. Montefiore Hosp., 494 Pa. 410, 431 A.2d 
920 (1981); Gradel V. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534,421 A.2d 674 (1980); Hamil V. Bashline, 
243 Pa. Super. 227, 364 A.2d 1366 (1976), vacated, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 
(1978); Herskovits V. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983) 
(en banc); Thornton V. Charleston Area Medical Center, 305 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 
1983). 
45. See generally Note, Increased Risk of Harm: A New Standard for Sufficiency of 
Evidence of Causation in Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U.L. REV. 275 (1985) 
[hereinafter Note, Increased Risk of Harm]. 
46. See, e.g., Alfonso V. Lund, 783 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying New Mexico 
law); Morgenroth V. Pacific Medical Center, 54 Cal. App. 3d 521, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
681 (1976); Gooding V. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); 
Curry V. Summer, 136 Ill. App. 3d 468, 483 N.E.2d 711 (1985); Weimer V. Hetrick, 
309 Md. 356, 525 A.2d 643 (1987); Glicklich V. Spievack, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 488, 
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Cooper v. Sisters o/Charity o/Cincinnati, Inc. 47 In Cooper, a 16-year-old 
boy was struck by a truck.48 He was later treated by the defendant doc-
tor at a hospita1.49 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's failure to 
perform various tests and failure to perform a necessary surgical proce-
dure resulted in the youth's death. 50 At trial, the evidence established 
that the boy would have had "around" a fifty percent chance of survival 
had the required surgery been performed. 5 I 
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed a directed verdict for the de-
fendant,52 holding that the plaintiff must establish proximate cause by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 53 Although acknowledging the tempta-
tion to relax the standard for proving causation in a wrongful death ac-
tion,54 the court remained firmly committed to the traditional 
preponderance standard. 55 
In Weimer v. Hetrick,56 decided by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land, a couple instituted a wrongful death action against an obstetri-
cian.57 The plaintiffs alleged that the doctor's failure to properly 
resuscitate their premature infant caused his death. 58 Evidence intro-
duced at trial, however, showed that the underlying cause of the infant's 
death, asphyxia, was a direct consequence of his prematurity. 59 The jury 
found that the doctor's conduct was not the proximate cause of the 
death. 60 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the standard for proving proxi-
mate cause should be relaxed, and that they should be allowed to recover 
452 N.E.2d 287, review denied, 390 Mass. 1103,454 N.E.2d 1276 (1983); Comfeldt 
v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980); Pillsbury-Hood v. Portsmouth Hosp., 
128 N.H. 299, 512 A.2d 1126 (1986); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, 
Inc., 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971); Sherer v. James, 290 S.C. 404, 351 
S.E.2d 148 (1986); Lee v. Andrews, 545 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
47. 27 Ohio St. 2d 242, 272 N.E.2d 97 (1971). 
48. Id. at 242, 272 N.E.2d at 98-99. 
49. Id. at 243, 272 N.E.2d at 99. 
50. Id. at 245-47, 272 N.E.2d at 100-01. 
51. Id. at 247, 272 N.E.2d at 101. 
52. Id. at 254, 272 N.E.2d at 105. 
53. Id. at 252, 272 N.E.2d at 103. 
54. Id. at 251-52, 272 N.E.2d at 103. The court noted that "[t]he strong intuitive sense 
of humanity tends to emotionally direct us toward a conclusion that in an action for 
wrongful death an injured person should be compensated for the loss of any chance 
of survival, regardless of its remoteness." Id. 
55. Id. at '252, 272 N.E.2d at 103. 
56. 309 Md. 536, 525 A.2d 643 (1987). 
57. Id. at 538-41, 525 A.2d at 644-46. 
58.Id. 
59. Hetrick v. Weimer, 67 Md. App. 522, 529, 508 A.2d 522, 525 (1986), rev'd, 309 Md. 
536,525 A.2d 643 (1987). 
60. Weimer, 309 Md. at 541, 525 A.2d at 646. Counts of survivorship and wrongful 
death went to the jury. Id. at 541, 525 A.2d at 645-46. Only issues relating to the 
wrongful death action were considered by the court of appeals. The plaintiffs, be-
cause they took no exception at trial to the jury instruction given for the survivor-
ship action, were precluded from raising loss of chance issues relating to that action 
on appeal. Id. at 545-46, 525 A.2d at 648. 
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if they proved that the doctor substantially reduced the child's chance of 
survival. 61 The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict,62 holding that 
"in an action under the wrongful death statute [the plaintiff] must show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the [negligent] conduct of the 
defendant . . . was a proximate cause of the death of the decedent. "63 
The courts in these decisions, while failing to recognize chances as pro-
tected interests, correctly refrained from distorting the preponderance 
standard for proving proximate cause. 
C. Recognition of Chances as Protected Interests 
In order to reach more equitable results in loss of chance cases, 
courts should tum their focus away from proximate cause and recognize 
that chances are protected interests. In tort, an injury is not limited to a 
tangible physical harm, but includes the invasion of any protected inter-
est. 64 Thus, in addition to manifested physical injuries, lost chances 
should be compensable interests.65 In loss of chance cases, a plaintiff 
should recover for the percentage probability that his chance of avoiding 
61. Id. at 541-43, 525 A.2d at 646-47. The plaintiffs requested a jury instruction consis-
tent with Hicks, providing that the jury should find causation if the doctor substan-
tially reduced the child's chance of survival. Id. at 643, 525 A.2d at 647. The 
plaintiffs contended that an earlier Maryland case, Thomas v. Corso, 265 Md. 84, 
288 A.2d 379 (1972), permitted such an instruction. The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held, however, that Corso did not alter the burden of proving causation. Wei-
mer, 309 Md. at 551-52, 525 A.2d at 650-51; see also Cooper v. Hartman, 311 Md. 
259,261, 533 A.2d 1294, 1294-95 (1987) (Corso did not create either a new tort or 
an additional basis for determining damages); King, supra note 1, at 1369 n.53 
(upon close examination the precedential force or scope of Corso may be limited). 
But see Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for the Loss of a Chance, 28 
MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 121, 135 (1982) (asserts that Corso did change the standard 
of proof); Comment, Proving Causation, supra note 2, at 759 (same). 
62. 309 Md. at 555, 525 A.2d at 652 (reversing the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland). 
63. Id. at 554, 525 A.2d at 652. The court concluded by noting that the Maryland 
wrongful death statute is in derogation of the common law and therefore must be 
strictly construed. Id. As such, the standard of causation cannot be relaxed 
through judicial interpretation. Id. 
In Weimer, the court of special appeals explicitly recognized the loss of a 
chance of survival as a compensable injury. Weimer, 67 Md. App. at 541, 508 A.2d 
at 531, rev'd, 309 Md. 536, 525 A.2d 643 (1987). The court of appeals, however, 
determined that this issue, properly pursued in the survivorship action, was not 
raised on appeal. Weimer, 309 Md. at 545-46,553 n.7, 525 A.2d at 648, 651 n.7; see 
also supra note 61. The court speculated that the plaintiff did not bring a loss of 
chance of survival action due to the court's holding in Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 
167 A.2d 773 (1961). Weimer, 309 Md. at 546 n.6, 525 A.2d at 648 n.6. In Rhone, 
the court of appeals held that the shortening of one's life expectancy is not a com-
pensable injury. Rhone, 224 Md. at 230, 167 A.2d at 778. 
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (actor is liable if the interest 
invaded is protected against unintentional invasion); see also Note, Increased Risk of 
Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REV. 563, 588 (1984) [hereinafter Note, 
Increased Risk of Cancer]. 
65. See King, supra note 1, at 1354; Wolfstone & Wolfs tone, supra note 61, at 122-23. 
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harm was diminished.66 
Several recent decisions involving medical malpractice have permit-
ted recovery for the loss of a chance.67 In James v. United States,68 for 
example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California recognized that a lost chance of survival is a protected inter-
est.69 The James court awarded the plaintiff damages for a loss of chance 
of survival stemming from delayed diagnosis and treatment of lung can-
cer.70 The court observed that "[n]o matter how small that chance may 
have been ... no one can say that the chance of prolonging one's life or 
decreasing suffering is valueless."71 
In DeBurkarte v. Louvar,72 the defendant's failure to diagnose the 
plaintiff's breast cancer at an early stage caused the disease to spread to 
the plaintiff's spine and leg.73 Furthermore, the plaintiff had to undergo 
a mastectomy and radiation treatment. 74 The plaintiff brought suit, al-
leging that the doctor's negligence caused her to lose a chance of 
survival. 75 
The Supreme Court of Iowa upheld a verdict for the plaintiff.76 The 
66. King, supra note 1, at 1382. Professor King asserts that pro-rata recovery should 
also be awarded for better-than-even chances. [d. at 1387. See infra notes 112-29 
and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of theories for computing damages. 
67. See, e.g., Waffen v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 799 F.2d 911 
(4th Cir. 1986) (applying Maryland law) (decided prior to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's decision in Weimer; recovery was denied because the lost chance was de 
minimis); O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971) (applying Iowa law) 
(plaintiff recovered for reduction of chance of survival from cancer); Mays v. United 
States, 608 F. Supp. 1476 (D. Colo. 1985) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 806 F.2d 
976 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3184 (1987); James V. United States, 
483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (same); Tappan V. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 
488 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (implied that recovery for lost chance of 
survival would be permitted); Williams V. Bay Hosp., Inc., 471 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Sanders V. Ghrist, 421 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1988) (plain-
tiffs entitled to jury instruction for lost chance of survival); DeBurkarte V. Louvar, 
393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986) (en banc) (recovery for loss of chance of survival); 
Hetrick V. Weimer, 67 Md. App. 522, 508 A.2d 522 (1986) (same), rev'd on other 
grounds, 309 Md. 536, 525 A.2d 643 (1987); McKellips V. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 
741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987) (same); Bellaire Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Campbell, 510 
S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (same). But see Clayton V. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 
439 (Miss. 1985) (rejects any theory of recovery for the loss of a chance). 
English courts also permit pro-rata recovery in medical malpractice cases. See 
Case Report, Delay in Diagnosis Resulting in 25% Loss of Chance of Good Recovery: 
Damages Awarded, 54 MEDICO LEGAL J. 54 (1986) (summarizing Hotson V. Fitz-
gerald, 3 All E.R. 167 (Q.B. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Hotson V. East Berkshire Area 
Health Auth., 2 All E.R. 909 (H.L. 1987». 
68. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
69. [d. at 587. 
70. [d. The court ruled that the plaintiff's recovery was attributable to "the loss of the 
opportunity for earlier and possibly more effective treatment .... " [d. 
71. [d. 
72. 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986) (en banc). 
73. [d. at 132. 
74. [d. 
75. [d. 
76. [d. at 140. 
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court held that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover for the lost 
chance.77 "Allowing recovery for the lost chance is ... the most equita-
ble approach because '[b]ut for the defendant's tortious conduct, it would 
not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of 
chance.' "78 Furthermore, the court noted that the tort system of loss 
allocation dictated that damages be assessed according to the percentage 
the defendant's conduct reduced the plaintiff's chance of survivaP9 
The recognition of chances as protected interests best serves public 
policy. Without this protection, a patient with a less-than-even chance of 
. avoiding harm or death would have no legal recourse against a doctor's 
negligent medical treatment. 80 This would result in a blanket release of 
doctors treating such patients, leaving many instances of negligent con-
duct unchecked.81 Moreover, an individual whose chance of survival has 
been reduced may lose the opportunity to benefit from any scientific 
breakthrough if the defendant's negligence has shortened the individual's 
expected lifespan. 82 Also, distortion of the preponderance standard 
would be unnecessary; a plaintiff in a loss of chance case would have to 
prove, consistent with the traditional preponderance standard, that the 
defendant proximately caused his injury - the lost chance.83 
Those opposed to the recognition of chances as protected interests 
assert that providing an additional cause of action to patients will in-
crease the cost of medical malpractice insurance and that such costs are 
passed on to patients in the form of higher costs for medical care.84 In-
surance costs, however, would likely be reduced because the quality and 
efficiency of health care would be strengthened by the deterrence placed 
77. /d. at 137. 
78. Id. (quoting King, supra note 1, at 1378). Expert testimony at trial established that 
the plaintiff had a 50% to 80% chance of survival at the time of the defendant's 
negligence. Id. at 137. The chance was reduced to zero at the time of the trial. Id. 
The supreme court ruled that the trial court's jury instruction, limiting damages to 
this reduction, was correct. Id. at 138. The court noted that this instruction pre-
cluded recovery for all damage relating to the underlying injury - the cancer. /d. 
79.Id. 
80. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
81. See Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 1021, 686 P.2d 149, 160 (1984) (to 
hold otherwise would put those with less than a 50% chance of recovery at the 
mercy of doctors); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 Wash. 2d 609, 614, 664 
P.2d 474, 477 (1983) (en banc) (not permitting recovery would result in a "blanket 
release" from liability of doctors and hospitals when the patient has less than a 50% 
chance of survival). 
82. Comment, Proving Causation, supra note 2, at 772 n.213. Although compensating 
these individuals for the lost chance will, of course, not restore their health, it is our 
legal system's only method for providing recovery for their injuries. 
83. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. 
84. See Note, Increased Risk of Harm, supra note 45, at 306-09; see also REPORT OF 
THE JOINT EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE, at 12 (Dec. 1985) (noting that four of the primary underwriters of 
medical malpractice insurance in Maryland raised their rates due to the increased 
number of claims and higher litigation costs). 
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on negligent health care practice. 85 Permitting recovery for valid tort 
claims operates to decrease instances of medical malpractice by compel-
ling doctors to practice defensive medicine by performing sufficient tests 
to make accurate diagnoses, investing in continuing professional educa-
tion and training, and abandoning procedures they cannot competently 
perform.86 Thus, this reduction in instances of medical malpractice 
would result in lower insurance premiums and lower costs to patients. 
Opponents also argue that recognition of the loss of a chance as a 
protected interest will "open the floodgates of litigation."87 The court 
system, however, particularly through the utilization of arbitration or 
medical malpractice screening tribunals, weeds out frivolous claims.88 
Furthermore, courts could also prevent a flood of loss of chance cases by 
refusing to permit recovery where the injury is de minimis.89 
III. RECOVERY FOR INCREASED RISK 
Increased risk situations arise where the negligent conduct of the 
defendant causes the plaintiff to incur an increased risk or susceptibility 
to a physical harm or disease.90 Increased risk cases are related concep-
tually to loss of chance situations. In both circumstances, negligent de-
fendants cause statistically measurable harm to plaintiffs. Courts which 
permit recovery for loss of chance and increased risk do not include the 
chance in their determination of the causation of the manifested physical 
injury, but instead recognize chances as protected interests.91 Thus, 
85. Note, Increased Risk of Harm, supra note 45, at 306-09; see also R. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, § 6.14, at 186-87 (1986) (the economic function of the 
tort negligence system is the deterrence of inefficient accidents). 
86. Note, Increased Risk of Harm, supra note 45, at 306-07. Individuals gauge amounts 
to be invested on safety precautions against accidents on a cost analysis basis. R. 
POSNER, supra note 85, § 6.1, at 147-51. Precautions are increased when the poten-
tial costs associated with tort liability outweigh the costs of taking precautions 
against possible negligence. Id.; see also Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost 
Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 985, 991 (1986) 
("Anticipation of liability propels potential defendants into taking further safety 
precautions .... "). See generally Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship 
Between Medical Malpractice and Quality of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1197 (1975). 
87. See Note, Increased Risk of Harm, supra note 45, at 309-11. This argument is com-
monly asserted against the recognition of any new cause of action. 
88. In 1976, the Maryland General Assembly passed the Maryland Health Claims Arbi-
tration Act. 1976 Md. Laws 495 (codified at MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3-2A-Ol to 3-2A-09 (1984 & Supp. 1987)). It has been asserted that this law has 
not met its purported goals of "weeding out" frivolous claims and easing court 
dockets. MacAlister & Scanlan, Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The Ex-
periment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 481, 500-04 (1985). 
89. See Waffen v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 799 F.2d 911,922-23 
(4th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff was denied recovery because lost chance was de minimis). 
90. See generally R. POSNER, supra note 85, § 6.7, at 168; J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND 
RECOVERY § 106, at 182-84 (1972); Note, Increased Risk of Cancer, supra note 64; 
Comment, Increased Risk of Disease From Hazardous Waste: A Proposal For Judi-
cial Relief, 60 WASH. L. REV. 635 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Increased Risk of 
Disease]. 
91. See generally infra notes 112-29 and accompanying text. 
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many courts have permitted recovery for increased risk using a rationale 
similar to that utilized by courts permitting recovery in loss of chance 
cases.92 
As in loss of chance cases, many courts erroneously focus on the 
increased risk as a factor in determining proximate cause.93 Thus, in a 
jurisdiction which does not recognize increased risk as a compensable 
harm, a plaintiff can recover only for the disease or injury to which they 
have become susceptible. Injuries arising from an industrial or nuclear 
accident may not manifest themselves for many years. In these, or other 
similar situations, a plaintiff faces a difficult decision. He may immedi-
ately pursue recovery for the disease or postpone any action until the 
disease manifests itself. 
If the plaintiff pursues an immediate remedy he will encounter diffi-
culty establishing proximate cause if his risk of contracting the disease is 
less than fifty percent.94 If the disease has yet to manifest itself, the 
plaintiff will not be able to prove damages 95 and any future suit may be 
barred by the doctrine of resjudicata.96 This would preclude any recov-
ery of damages should the disease later manifest itself. 
If the plaintiff chooses to postpone any remedy until his actual dam-
ages are ascertained, his action may be barred by a statute of limitations 
92. See infra notes 100, 102-05 and accompanying text. 
93. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (plaintiff must meet reasonable certainty standard for proving future injuries 
or damage); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521-24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985) (permitting recovery for increased chance encourages the use of speculative 
evidence); Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666-69, 464 A.2d 
1020, 1026-28 (1983) (damages for prospective harm may only be recovered where 
the harm will probably or certainly be manifested); Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 
62, 344 A.2d 422, 427-28 (1975) (same); Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 634 (W. 
Va. 1974) (same). See generally King, supra note 1, at 1370-73; Comment, The 
Right to Recover, supra note 3, at 991-92. 
94. Unless suit is brought in a jurisdiction which has relaxed the standard for proving 
causation, the plaintiff will not be able to establish proximate cause. See supra 
notes 24-34 and accompanying text; see also Wilson, 684 F.2d at 119; Pierce, 296 
Md. at 666, 464 A.2d at 1026; King, supra note 1, at 1372-73; Note, Increased Risk 
o/Cancer, supra note 64, at 637-39; Comment, Increased Risk 0/ Disease, supra note 
90, at 637-39. 
95. Until the disease manifests itself, the plaintiff will not know the extent of costs for 
his health care, medicine, lost wages and disability. See Wilson, 684 F.2d at 120 
(noting that calculation of damages for lung cancer when the disease was not yet 
manifested is too speculative for the plaintiff to recover); Pierce, 296 Md. at 666, 464 
A.2d at 1026 (same). 
96. Generally, 
the doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment rendered 
upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent juris-
diction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby 
litigated as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same 
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. 
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 394 (1969); see also Harding v. Ramsay, Scarlett & 
Co., 599 F. Supp. 180, 183 (D. Md. 1984) (discussing the application of res judicata 
in Maryland). 
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in jurisdictions not recognizing the discovery rule. 97 Even if the discov-
ery rule applies, allowing the plaintiff to bring suit, a plaintiff who waits 
years to litigate a claim faces other impediments including lost evidence, 
faded memories and disappearing witnesses.98 Furthermore, the defend-
ant, especially a corporate defendant, may no longer be in existence or 
may be judgment proof.99 
Recognizing the inequities faced by plaintiffs under these circum-
stances, some courts view increased risk as a redressable injury and have 
assessed damages according to the increase in susceptibility to injury or 
disease caused by the defendant's conduct. 100 Other courts, while recog-
nizing the unfairness in such situations, do not permit recovery for the 
97. See Note, Increased Risk o/Cancer, supra note 64, at 575. Under the discovery rule, 
a cause of action accrues when a "wrong is discovered or with due diligence it 
should have been discovered." Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 634-35, 431 
A.2d 677, 679 (1981). In Maryland, the discovery rule is applicable in all civil ac-
tions. Id. at 636, 431 A.2d at 680. 
An action against a health care provider, however, must be brought "within 
the earlier of: (1) Five years of the time the injury was committed; or (2) Three years 
of the date the injury was discovered." MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-
109 (Supp. 1987). In 1987, the Maryland General Assembly further limited the 
applicability of the discovery rule. The age at which the statute of limitations com-
mences for minors, in actions against health care providers, has been reduced from 
age sixteen to age eleven. See 1987 Md. Laws 2703 (codified at § 5-109(b». Also, 
any action for damages arising out of an occupational disease must be brought 
"within 3 years of the discovery of facts from which it was known or reasonably 
should have been known that an occupational disease was the proximate cause of 
death, but in any event not later than 10 years from the date of death." § 5-113. 
98. Note, Increased Risk 0/ Cancer, supra note 64, at 574 ("cancer symptoms first ap-
pear many years after [negligent conduct], long after evidence necessary to establish 
the defendant's negligence has been lost or destroyed"). In Pierce, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland noted that these factors encourage prompt adjudication of 
claims. Pierce, 296 Md. at 665-66, 464 A.2d at 1026. 
99. See Note, Increased Risk 0/ Cancer, supra note 64, at 575. The author also asserts 
that a prompt action for increased susceptibility·more effectively deters corporations 
from conducting tortious activity than a later action for the manifested result of a 
tort. Id. at 582-86; see also Comment, Increased Risk 0/ Disease, supra note 90, at 
645 (potential future lawsuits do not encourage present safeguards against the mis-
handling of hazardous waste). 
100. See, e.g., Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying 
Louisiana law) (plaintiff incurred a risk of future medical complications due to bul-
let lodged in his neck), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Sterling V. Velsico1 Chem-
ical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (recovery allowed for increased 
susceptibility to liver and kidney cancer); Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. 
Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (recovery allowed for increased risk of developing ar-
thritis); McCall V. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1962) (recovery al-
lowed for an increased chance of becoming epileptic); Linsay V. Appleby, 91 Ill. 
App. 3d 705, 414 N.E.2d 885 (1980) (recovery allowed for risk of injury related to 
plaintiff's predisposition to seizures); Davis V. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) 
(recovery allowed for increased susceptibility to meningitis); Charlton Bros. Transp. 
Co. v. Garrettson, 188 Md. 85, 51 A.2d 642 (1947) (recovery allowed for increased 
hazard of a recurring hernia); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 
675 (1973) (recovery allowed for increased susceptibility to meningitis); Schwegel v. 
Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 228 A.2d 405 (1967) (recovery allowed for increased 
chance of developing seizures). 
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increased chance, but have allowed recovery for the cost of medical sur-
veillance of the plaintiff's condition. lol 
In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 102 the plaintiffs brought a 
class action suit against the defendant,103 alleging that hazardous chemi-
cal waste seeping from a burial site on the defendant's property into the 
plaintiffs' well water caused them to incur an enhanced susceptibility to 
liver and kidney cancer.l04 The United States District Court for the 
Western District of Tennessee allowed the plaintiffs to recover for their 
injuries, recognizing that "enhanced susceptibility is an existing condi-
tion, and not a speculative future injury."105 
One court, in disallowing recovery for increased risk, noted that 
plaintiffs who later manifest the disease to which they have become more 
susceptible, will be undercompensated. 106 Having recovered for the in-
creased risk, they are estopped from pursuing an action for the mani-
fested disease. 107 Furthermore, a plaintiff who fails to contract the 
disease has received a financial windfall. 108 This argument does not rec-
ognize the increased risk as a compensable injury which is separate and 
distinct from the manifestation of the disease itself. Thus, for example, a 
court should permit a plaintiff to recover for an increased susceptibility 
to cancer, and commence a second action if the latent disease manifests 
itself.109 Any recovery received in the second action would be discounted 
by damages received in the first action.llo 
The underlying rationale for permitting recovery for increased risk 
and loss of chance is the recognition of chances as protected interests. 
Thus, a jurisdiction which recognizes a cause of action for either in-
creased risk or loss of chance should necessarily recognize a cause of 
action for the other.1I1 Recognition of both causes of action would result 
in the most equitable distribution of resources among litigants. 
IV. VALUATION OF CHANCES 
If a court determines that the loss of a chance or an increased risk 
101. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (applying New 
Jersey law); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495 
(1985). It has also been suggested that insurance coverage should be awarded in lieu 
of monetary relief when an individual has been exposed to an increased risk of dis-
ease. See Comment, Increased Risk of Disease, supra note 90, at 650. 
102. 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.O. Tenn. 1986). 
103. Id. at 306. 
104. [d. at 308. 
105. Id. at 322. 
106. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fl3. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
107.Id. 
108. [d. 
109. Principles of res judicata would not apply because the second action is brought for a 
new injury. See generally supra note 96. 
110. See King, supra note I, at 1382 ("Compensation should be calculated in a way that 
avoids double recovery for the same injury"). 
111. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
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are compensable injuries, it must formulate a method to assess damages 
properly. Generally, there are two methods of valuing chances. I 12 First, 
a court could permit the trier of fact to value the chance without judicial 
instruction, permitting the trier of fact to utilize their perception of the 
plaintiff's injury and value it according to its experience, judgment, and 
everyday common sense. I 13 
This method is the simplest because the introduction of statistical 
evidence is unnecessary.1I4 The goals of substantial justice and precise 
loss allocation between the litigants, however, are not satisfied unless a 
more predictable and rational method of calculating damages is 
employed. I IS 
A preferable method for the valuation of chances is to value the 
injury according the percentage probability that the plaintiff's chance of 
avoiding harm has diminished. I 16 In loss of chance cases, the percentage 
probability method is applied by determining the diminution of the plain-
tiff's chance of avoiding harm. 117 Thus, in the loss of chance of survival 
scenario depicted in the Introduction, where the plaintiff's chance of sur-
vival has been reduced from forty to twenty percent, the plaintiff should 
receive twenty percent of the value of the decedent's life. I IS This method 
of calculating damages offers greater precision than the previous method 
and does not impose an unduly difficult mathematical task on the trier of 
112. See King, supra note 1, at 1381-87. 
113. Id. at 1381-82. 
114. Professor Tribe argues "that the costs of attempting to integrate mathematics into 
the factfinding process of a legal trial outweigh the benefits." Tribe, Trial By Mathe-
matics: Precision and Ritual In the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1377 
(1971). Tribe points out several costs of using statistical data, including: (1) the 
distortion of results due to the "overimpressiveness" of numbers; (2) those factors 
which cannot be quantified may, in the eyes of the trier of fact, lose their relative 
importance; (3) and the weighing process conducted by a jury may be "dehuman-
ized" by excessive use of statistical data. Id. at 1361, 136S, 137S-76. 
The use of statistical data, however, appears to be inherently necessary to cal-
culate damages if chances are to be deemed compensable interests. King, supra note 
1, at 138S. Loss of chance plaintiffs must introduce statistics to establish the extent 
of their injuries. Comment, Proving Causation, supra note 2, at 786. Even Professor 
Tribe concedes that "all factual evidence is ultimately 'statistical,' and all legal 
proof ultimately 'probabilistic,' in the epistemological sense .... " Tribe, supra, at 
1330 n.2 (emphasis in original). Moreover, juries have proven themselves to be 
competent in handling statistical data. See supra note 3; see also Comment, Proving 
Causation, supra note 2, at 786 n.291 (noting the use of statistics in civil rights, 
antitrust, and fraud actions). 
liS. King, supra note 1, at 1382. Although medicine is not an exact science, statistics 
may be utilized to quantify medical data with some precision. See supra note 8; 
infra notes 118-19. 
116. King, supra note 1, at 1382. 
117.Id. 
118. This result is reached by subtracting the 20% chance of survival from the 40% 
chance of survival. The trier of fact would determine the total loss attributable to 
an injury taking into consideration factors such as the extent of any physical disabil-
ity, pain and suffering, lost wages, and medical expenses. See generally R. GILBERT, 
P. GILBERT & R. GILBERT, MARYLAND TORT LAW HANDBOOK, § 2S.1.2, at 249-
SI (1986). 
156 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 17 
fact. 119 
The application of the percentage probability method is more com-
plicated in increased risk cases, because these cases depend upon the pre-
diction of a series of future events. 120 The percentage probability method 
may be applied in two ways, the "single outcome" calculation or the 
"weighted mean" calculation. l2l Using the single outcome calculation, 
the trier of fact would determine the most likely time for the occurrence 
of the future harm or disease; next, the trier of fact must determine the 
loss attributable to the harm at that time. 122 Finally, damages are deter-
mined by multiplying the probability that the plaintiff may incur that 
harm at that time by the 10SS.123 
The most accurate method of determining probabilities in increased 
risk cases, however, is the "weighted mean" calculation. 124 Under this 
method, the trier of fact is required to compute the " 'weighted average 
of all possible outcomes, the weight assigned to each outcome being de-
termined by the likelihood of its occurrence.' "125 
The difference between the simple probability and weighted mean 
methods is best understood through the following illustration. 126 Sup-
pose that the defendant's negligence causes the plaintiff to incur an in-
creased susceptibility to blindness and the chance of the blindness 
occurring at any time during the plaintiff's lifetime is thirty percent. 
Utilizing the simple probability method, the trier of fact must determine 
the most likely time the blindness will occur and the loss attributable to 
blindness occurring at that time. Assume that the most likely age for the 
onset of blindness is determined to be age fifty and that the loss attributa-
ble to the condition is $100,000. The trier of fact would multiply 
$100,000 by the thirty percent increased susceptibility and award the 
plaintiff $30,000. 
The weighted mean method more accurately determines damages by 
allowing consideration of other possible outcomes. Thus, assume that 
the plaintiff has a twenty-five percent chance of becoming blind at age 
fifty, a four percent chance at age forty, and a one percent chance at age 
thirty. Furthermore, the damages will be $100,000 if blindness occurs at 
119. Epidemiologic proof may be used to ascertain damages in chance cases. See gener-
ally Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 732 (1984). Epidemiology is a "scientific discipline that deals with the 
integrated use of statistics and biological/medical science to identify and establish 
the causes of human disease." [d. at 736. 
120. King, supra note I, at 1383. Damages for future losses will be reduced to present 
value; see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 13, § 86, at 304. Complex present value cal-
culations are routinely undertaken to determine future lost wages. See also supra 
note 114. 
121. King, supra note I, at 1383-85. 
122. [d. at 1383. 
123. [d. 
124. Id. at 1384. 
125. Id. (quoting Schaefer, supra note II, at 722). 
126. [d. at 1383-84. 
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age fifty, $200,000 at age forty, and $300,000 at age thirty. The damages 
would be calculated by aggregating these possible outcomes. Thus, com-
pensable damages would be the sum of $25,000, (twenty-five percent 
mUltiplied by $100,000), $8,000 (four percent multiplied by $200,000), 
and $3,000 (one percent multiplied by $300,000), or a total damage 
award of $36,000. 
Although the weighted mean method is the most complicated of the 
three methods, juries, with proper instruction, have proven capable of 
handling complex statistical data. 127 Because most factual scenarios pro-
duce an infinite number of possible outcomes,128 courts will have to 
weigh the goals of precision and manageability to limit the number of 
possible outcomes used in the calculation. 129 Still, the weighted mean 
method remains the most precise calculation for the equitable distribu-
tion of damage awards in increased risk cases. 
V. CHANCE LITIGATION IN MARYLAND: WHAT NEXT? 
No direct precedent for the recognition of a cause of action for the 
loss of a chance exists in Maryland.130 The court of special appeals, in 
Weimer, explicitly recognized the loss of a chance of survival as a com-
pensable injury.l3l The court of appeals, however, reversed, holding that 
the issue as to whether chances are protected interests was not raised on 
appeal.132 The court added that whether Hicks' language133 "will prove 
to be an augury of a burgeoning new tort or introduce a new factor for 
consideration of damages in tort cases producing injury or death are is-
sues for another day .... "134 
The court of special appeals decision in Weimer and the Fourth Cir-
cuit's subsequent reliance on that decision in Waffen v. United States De-
127. See supra notes 31 and 114. 
128. See King, supra note 1, at 1384. A plaintiff might introduce evidence displaying a 
different possible outcome for every day of his remaining life. 
129. A court could limit the introduction of statistical data into evidence by limiting such 
evidence to yearly, or some other, less frequent change in possible outcomes. 
130. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. 
131. Hetrick v. Weimer, 67 Md. App. 522, 541, 508 A.2d 522, 531 (1986), rev'd, 309 Md. 
536, 525 A.2d 643 (1987). 
132. Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536, 545-46, 553 n.7, 525 A.2d 643, 648, 651 n.7 
(1987). 
133. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. 
134. Weimer, 309 Md. at 553, 525 A.2d at 652; see also id. at 556, 525 A.2d at 653 
(McAuliffe, J., concurring) ("I am unwilling to say that neither Hicks v. United 
States . .. nor Thomas v. Corso . .. suggests a favorable inclination toward a claim 
for damages resulting from the loss of a substantial chance of survival"). 
In Cooper v. Hartman, 311 Md. 259, 533 A.2d 1294 (1987), the court ofap-
peals remanded a case which presented loss of chance issues. In that case, the plain-
tiff asserted that the failure of the defendant to diagnose a bone infection caused him 
to lose a two-inch section of his right leg. Id. at 261-62, 533 A.2d at 1295. The 
court remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the plaintiff's failure to present 
quantitative evidence regarding his chance of avoiding the damage to his leg, pre-
cluded a finding for the plaintiff. Id. at 269-72, 533 A.2d at 1299-1300. 
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partment of Health & Human Services 135 are well-reasoned opmlons 
which explain why chances should be protected interests. "[I]t is better 
to consider the loss of a substantial chance of survival as a different type 
of loss with a different measure of damages than the loss of life, instead of 
treating the former as a variation of the burden of proving causation in a 
claim for negligently causing the patient's death."136 
There is precedent for the recognition of a cause of action for in-
creased risk. In Charlton Bros. Transportation Co. v. Garrettson, \37 the 
plaintiff was thrown from his seat on a street car when the car collided 
with a tractor-trailer. 138 He suffered an increased susceptibility to a her-
nia.139 Prior to the fall his risk was ten percent; after the injury his risk 
increased to fifty percent. l40 Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff 
sustained a less-than-even chance of suffering a hernia, the court of ap-
peals recognized the increased susceptibility as an injury and allowed the 
plaintiff to recover damages for the harm he incurred. 141 
The court of appeals, in permitting recovery for increased risk in 
Garrettson, has accepted the underlying rationale - that chances are 
protected interests - which supports the recognition of a cause of action 
for loss of chance. 142 Furthermore, Judge McAuliffe's concurring opin-
ion in Weimer indicates a strong inclination toward the adoption of a 
cause of action for loss of chance of survival. 143 The recognition of 
chances as protected interests in Maryland would result in the most equi-
table disposition of cases involving plaintiffs who have suffered statisti-
cally demonstrable injuries resulting from another's negligence. 
135. 799 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1986). 
136. Id. at 919 (emphasis in original). 
137. 188 Md. 85, 51 A.2d 642 (1947). 
138. Id. at 90, 51 A.2d at 644. 
139. Id. at 94, 51 A.2d at 646. 
14O.Id. 
141. Id. at 94-95, 51 A.2d at 646. Two subsequent court of appeals decisions have seem-
ingly lessened Garrettson's precendential value. In Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales 
Corp., 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020 (1983), the plaintiff developed an increased risk 
to lung cancer due to extended exposure to asbestos. Id. at 658-59, 464 A.2d at 
1022. In Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422 (1975), the plaintiff, a young 
girl, was severely injured when she was struck by a truck. Id. at 56-57, 344 A.2d at 
425. Injuries to her pelvis caused her to suffer an increased risk that she could bear 
children only by caesarean section. Id. at 57, 344 A.2d at 425. 
In both cases, the court of appeals did not recognize chances as protected, 
compensable interests; the court included the increased risks as factors for determin-
ing the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' unmanifested physical conditions. See 
Pierce, 296 Md. at 666-68, 464 A.2d at 1026-28; Davidson, 276 Md. at 62, 344 A.2d 
at 427-28. Garrettson was not discussed in either of these decisions. See Pierce, 296 
Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020; Davidson, 276 Md. 54, 344 A.2d 422. 
142. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
143. See Weimer, 309 Md. at 556, 525 A.2d at 653 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). In 
Cooper v. Hartman, 311 Md. 259, 264-67, 533 A.2d 1294, 1296-98 (1987), the court 
of appeals discussed at length the recent popularity of the loss of chance doctrine. 
The court, however, did not decide whether the doctrine exists in Maryland, and 
remanded the case. See supra note 134. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Failure to recognize chances as protected interests wrongfully denies 
recovery to plaintiffs with a less-than-even chance of sustaining physical 
harm. To protect these plaintiffs, courts must recognize that chances are 
protected interests and acknowledge that lost chances and increased risks 
are compensable injuries. Moreover, such recognition inhibits any judi-
cial inclination to "distort" the traditional preponderance standard for 
proving proximate cause. 
The percentage probability method should be used to calculate dam-
ages in chance cases. This method most fairly and accurately measures 
the value of a chance. Finally, recognition of chances as protected inter-
ests would best serve tort deterrence objectives and most equitably allo-
cate resources between tortiously injured plaintiffs and negligent 
defendants. 
Howard Ross Feldman 
